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Abstract: 
In this article I represent in the form of the formalized system that fragment of logic of a 
natural language which from an antiquity is intuitively used by economists at drawing up of 
tables which carry an imagery of relations of sets. For this representation I develop existen-
tial linearly-tabular diagrams. These diagrams are graphically reduced form of record of the 
logic information of statistical tables. The fragment of the diagrammatic dictionary of logic 
forms of attributive propositions is shown. (This full dictionary contains 148 diagrams). 
The algorithm of a diagrammatic method of drawing and checking of all possible conclu-
sions from n any such propositions-premises with compound positive and negative terms is 
given. Free (consciously controllable) mastering of all logic natural language’s means is 
necessary for optimal performance of economic thinking. Logical culture of natural lan-
guage should be high enough for any scientist, economist, lawyer and simply a business-
man.  
 
Logical modes of thinking and inference ability are necessary conditions of rational use of 
resources, first of all, in the field of economics. 
The economic scientific thinking, as well as scientific thinking in general, is impossible 
without practical logic of tables. The accounting tables were under construction on the papyrus in 
Ancient Egypt; the editor of tables is one of the most used programs in a computer. Nevertheless, 
people, acquiring this or that economic profession, don’t study Logic as special discipline (as a ma-
jority of scientists, which work in other fields of science). What does logic ensuring of economic 
thinking and economic science represent itself? Without special study of Logic it can be only some 
realized intuitive logic. And, in this case, it’s practical logic. For theory i.e. for accuracy of theoreti-
cal inferences, proofs and explanations, for logic systematization of theoretical concepts and propo-
sitions deductive logic is necessary. It is the most important section of Logic as a whole. As the 
result there is a question: what deductive practical logic of economic consciousness should be? If 
economic faculties included the standard courses of Logic in the curriculum, in these conditions the 
basic place in them would be occupied by traditional "philosophical" and classical mathematical 
logic (propositional logic and predicate logic). However, the classical propositional logic and predi-
cate logic is unacceptable as real practical logic even in Mathematics, in view of paradoxes of mate-
rial implication, i.e. such formulas as A → (B → A), A & A → B and others [4]. According to 
these paradoxical formulas, the true proposition can be proved by any proposition, and the false 
proposition can be a sufficient reason for any proposition. To recognize these formulas as the laws 
of logic would mean firstly, a recognition of arguments of the any propositions as competent, irre-
spective of whether they’re pertinent to and whether they’re true, and secondly, acknowledgement 
of competence of any propositions as consequences from the obviously false propositions. If the 
first fact could bring to arbitrariness in argument, the second, on account of the responsibility for 
consequences, could bring to some arbitrariness in definition of consequences, which there comes 
the responsibility for.  
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Is intuitive, correct use of natural language’s logic enough in expression of scientific eco-
nomic thinking? In a principle it must be insufficient. The science proposes universal recognition of 
the truth and checkability of evidences. If the accuracy of logic proof didn’t become clear for oth-
ers, also thesis of the proof can’t be considered proved, even if the proof is constructed correctly on 
intuition. Besides, the intuitive logic doesn’t relieve of mistakes, which could be eliminated at the 
conscious control. Here of follows, that for economic consciousness is useful not only intuitive, but 
also realized practical logic, i.e. system of the scientifically developed means and methods of the 
conscious logic control of reasoning. 
The subject should draw correct conclusions from general scientific positions to follow the 
scientific recommendations consciously. The practical logic, which serves as basis for it, is a system 
of rules, norms, and in case of need it is possible to get a new true knowledge from initial veritable 
knowledge using them. The fact is to realize and to improve practical logic, used for clear percep-
tion of economic relations.  
The scientifically realized practical logic is system of control over expression of ideas and 
purposeful formation of thinking logicality and its general basic principle is accordance of logic 
knowledge to users’ interests. Derivative principles are the following: interrelation between verbal 
component of thinking, images and practical actions; the most full mastering of logic forms of con-
cepts, propositions, inferences and language expression of these forms; original, not imparted to the 
machine with the purpose of intuitive logicality forming, accomplishment of logic operations. 
The principle of accordance to consumers’ interests demands a choice of optimum means 
and methods, which give possibility to attain the certain result with the minimal expenses and to 
attain the maximum of results with the certain expenses. This principle is recognition that extreme 
principles work in economic activity as a whole and in its mental component in particular. For any 
mass logical economic thinking the realized logic, which is extremely relieved of unnecessary com-
plications, is extremely approached to intuitively used logic.  
 In the first place, the practical logic of economic thinking is natural language’s logic. 
Firstly, people use this language in comprehension of the economic reality and when they carry on 
business negotiations. Secondly, natural language is a language of economic science. 
Free (consciously controllable) mastering of all logic natural language’s means is necessary 
for optimal performance of economic thinking. But it doesn’t exclude, of cause, that an artificial 
language can be used in addition to this in an economic science, for example, in sphere of mathe-
matical modelling. Therefore, the practical logic of economic thinking can’t be limited just by mas-
tering of those forms of attributive propositions, which traditional logic courses offer. 
In these courses traditional syllogistics is the closest discipline to logic of natural language. 
It considers just universal affirmative (A), particular affirmative (I), universal negative (E) and par-
ticular negative (O) propositions about properties and it establishes rules of formal inference only 
for them. In these courses the presence of allocating and excluding propositions is admitted, in spite 
of syllogistics. The traditional logic courses don’t still instruct to supervise the information, trans-
mitted by all logic forms of natural language’s propositions. 
It goes without saying, that intuitive thinking uses all natural language’s logic means worse 
or better, but their development, use and connection with the certain meanings mostly are spontane-
ous and they aren’t subject to the conscious control. There are 304 forms of attributive propositions 
about subjects only in the dictionary, developed by the author. Also the similar dictionaries of the 
forms of propositions about cases, places, times, points of view are offered. In these dictionaries the 
existential linear-tabular diagrams (ELTD), which give the information about existence or non-
existence of elements with some attributes, are given. 
It is not enough just to establish a fact that the classical logic doesn’t observe to “intuition of 
logic consequence”. It is necessary to clear up, what intuition is based on, what is considered to be 
such intuition, if the accuracy of inference or substantiation can be consciously proved to other peo-
ple and, in turn, be realized by them, to rely on this intuition. And it’s in condition that neither sci-
entific economist nor, moreover, business partners for the most part didn’t study any syllogistics or, 
and what is more, any symbolical logic. Nevertheless, opportunity of such proof in such condition 
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exists. But this opportunity isn’t created with presence of traditional syllogistics’ rules or with 
methods of symbolical logic. It’s created with people’s ability to imagine pictorially, what actually 
speech is about, what information about the object is reported and, accordingly, what information 
can be taken from this not formalized basis in the consequence. On this basis Johnson-Lard, the 
representative of cognitive Psychology, opposed a semantic method to Logic [1]. However, this 
method, according to its subject, as a method of the correct construction of argumentations, is the 
logic method, and namely it’s method of pictorial practical logic (method of pictorial logic seman-
tics). Without doubt, it isn’t a method only of the symbolical transformation of ones propositions in 
others, but it’s a method of logic processing of the information, transmitted by image of meanings 
of these logic propositional forms. Johnson- Laird writes, that there is alternative theory, which is 
much easier, than the theory, offered by Newell, ("the theory based on the same general lines, 
which depends on the close relation between the Venn diagrams and the table of  truth") and gives 
an example of application of this theory [1]. The quoted words in themselves specify a connection 
between his method and logic methods; and the example, resulted by him, reveals analogy of this 
method and the method of ELTD, offered us.  
In offered pictorial practical logic [7], [8], [9] the conclusions are made on the basis of the 
direct account of the transmitted information; but it doesn’t mean at all, that the rules of conclusion 
aren’t used in them. These rules were written down symbolically by L. Carroll, and it doesn’t con-
trary to the fact that people use these rules, but not formulas of them. The symbolical expressions in 
pictorial practical logic have only those meanings, which the appropriate images give them. Such 
image can be a perception of reality, a qualitatively similar representation about it, and a qualita-
tively dissimilar diagrammatic image of the relations between sets. The economic consciousness is 
connected with events in macrocosm. They are direct appeared in macro forms or, at least, they 
indirectly contact with sensual perception of their conditions, reasons and sequels. Otherwise, they 
can’t be neither proved nor regulated. 
The economic consciousness is called up to adjust such activity, where an image of desirable 
result and image of action leading to this result are necessary. In this activity the symbols should be 
connected with images. 
Law of sufficient logical reason should be observed in economic thinking: just information, 
presented in reason, can be taken in consequence. Such understanding of the law of sufficient logi-
cal reason can be expressed by formula: А  А  (А  В), where A and B – information, irrespective 
of the fact which propositional forms it is transferred by. The formula means: consequence with 
information A follows from the reason, which contains just the same or the same and additional 
information. All what is supposed by paradoxes of true and false propositions in classical logic is 
forbidden by such understanding of the law of sufficient logical reason; it is forbidden to see the 
logical reason in those propositions, which don’t carry information contained in thesis, subjected to 
substantiation; it is forbidden to make any conclusions from false information, given by some sub-
ject; but it is allowed to allocate false information for refutation. The practical logic doesn’t substi-
tute the conjunction "If..., then...." by material implication, but namely this substitution conducts to 
paradoxes.  
Sentences of some text by themselves at all don’t contain information about object, which is 
real logical reason for conclusions. These sentences are informative propositions (i.e. propositions 
about reality) if only they due an image of valid object or indirect displays of its existence in details 
or as a whole. But also the images are true, merely if there is only that information in them (form 
liable to reflection), which is in reflected. It means, in the end, that only perception of object’s de-
tails, kept as pictorial idea (besides, perception common for different subjects) is the original final 
logical reason for conclusion.  
The transformation of the information into commodity value demands an avoidance of 
losses and distortion of information, transmitted by natural language’s logic means. For achieve-
ment of unequivocal understanding of these means by different people in different conditions a 
proved normative pictorial definition of these means’ meanings is necessary.  
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The interpretations, given to propositions (A, E, I, O) in the majority of formalized symboli-
cal syllogistics, are different and mostly obviously artificial. As a result of adjustment under con-
formity to such artificial figure, as logic square there are such interpretations in language of predi-
cate logic, which include material Implication. With such interpretation a simple categorical propo-
sition ceases to be categorical, turns to complex conditional proposition or in proposition with logic 
"or" and it ceases to carry certain information about  discussing case. For example, «Some goods 
(S) have no demand (P) ", actually, it is supposed to interpret so: «There are no goods (S) or there 
are goods which haven’t a demand (S not-P)" {Writing down in the language of predicate logic: x 
S(x)  x (S(x) & P(x)), what’s equivalent of x S(x)  x(S(x) & P(x) [6]}. Hardly any 
economist will consider it as the categorical proposition about presence or absence of goods. But 
what interpretation is not artificial? How other propositional forms must be interpreted? There is a 
need to answer these questions using sociolinguistic researches, because the problem at issue is a 
natural language as a mean of mass intercourse. It is possible to learn about words’ meanings got 
owing to historical spontaneous process, only from people. To attribute to the words artificial mean-
ings (by virtue of gnoseology or other reasons) means transformation of natural language in more or 
less artificial one.  
It’s hardly effective to impose the artificial meanings of words to mass of people. A validity 
criterion of A, E, I, O and many other interpretations of propositional forms should be not arbitrary 
formation of syllogistic systems, even if they satisfy to these or those criteria of Symbolical logic, 
but the reference, firstly, to the practice of mass dialogue in natural language, and, secondly, to that 
level of thinking, on which illogicality is corrected by impracticability of actions, appropriate to 
wrong interpretation. At such reference the rules of logic act as component of symbol-
representational models, appropriate to sensual experience and validity. Conformity to validity, as it 
is given in practical experience, becomes thus criterion of validity of logic constructions.  
To find out meanings attached to logic means of natural language, the technique of research 
with using of questionnaire was developed and applied by author [9]. In this questionnaire the logic 
means of language correspond with all probable (allowable) variants of meanings, appropriate or 
inappropriate to these means, i.e. sentences with these means. Form of accordance of these mean-
ings given in this questionnaire doesn’t demand any special training. A respondent should answer 
what combinations of presence or absence of attributes correspond to the specified sentence, and 
what combinations don’t correspond.  
Reveal of character of relations between sets of discussed elements correspond to some lan-
guage expression of logic proposition form, allows to find out, what information this expression 
carries, and to transfer this information with one existential linear-tabular diagram. (It’s required 
more than one of Euler diagrams for demonstration of all opportunities corresponding to this or that 
language expression of the logic proposition form). Euler diagrams mostly are offered in textbooks, 
but using of tables as logic diagrams is considerably more productive. Any economist and over-
whelming majority of population are accustomed to use and understanding of tables. However, con-
struction of both Euler diagram and table is a result of some kind of precomputation. For such 
ELTD are optimal (see: the diagram 1 in the following complete set). It’s possible to have a prepa-
ration of such diagram’s linear part in electronic variant or in the form of logic rule. The sample of 
the diagrams of relations between concepts is given below: A – money; B – value; C – paper prod-
uct; D – rouble.   
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B                               
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A   3  7        C 
6 
D 11 15 
 
Fig. 1. 
Diagrams in this complete set on Fig.1 are: 1 – ELTD, linear-tabular diagram with image of 
obviously empty sets (completed with a logic ruler). {With the ruler the diagram is more convenient 
to draw on a clean sheet. The scale if this logical ruler is like a logical Marquand rectangular draw-
ings which S. Lushchevska-Romanova  improved and T. Kotarbinsky used [2] and [3]}; 2 – linear-
tabular diagram without the image of obviously empty sets; 3 – Euler diagram complemented with 
image of all discussed (universe), i.e. with rectangle; 4 – obvious combination of the linear diagram 
and table; 5 – table. Usual, but basically not obligatory, difference between registration table and 
linear diagram of existence is: on the diagram not numbers are put, but marks of existence (for ex-
ample, "+" instead of nonzero number, or "-" instead of zero).  
The definition of common acceptable meanings of a language’s logic means allows conclud-
ing, with a higher degree of probability, that the certain form of proposition carries such-and-such 
information. The fragment of the diagram dictionary of logic propositional forms about discussed 
subjects looks with use of ELTD like this: 
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В not-В 
А not-А А not-А 
 
+    There is А В. Some А is В. Some В is А. 
+ +   Not only А (not-А) is В. Not each (every, all) В is А (not-А). 
-    There isn’t А В. No А is В. No В is А. 
-  -  There isn’t А. There isn’t А В and there isn’t А not-В. 
+  -  Each (every, all...)  А is В. // Only В is А. 
+ - -  Only each А is В. By definition, А is В. 
- + + - Each, except А, is В. Each, except not-А, is not-В. 
.  .  There is А (В or not-В).  
 
 
Fig. 2. 
Diagrammatic dictionaries of forms of propositional about cases, places (loci), times and 
points of view have an analogous kind. In such forms terms are the propositions (for example: "Al-
ways, when all, except A, is B, then any C is not A".). In representational construction of logic of 
natural language the proposition “If A, (then) B" ("In a case if A, (then) B") is interpreted as equiva-
lent to proposition "there are no cases in which there is A, but there isn’t B". It eliminates paradoxes 
of implication.  
The diagrams of meanings of separate propositions and information of these diagrams (ta-
bles) can be combined in one diagram (table) of the reason. Such combination can make the new 
information. For a wide class of tasks the tabulation is the confirmed century practice, optimum on 
a ratio of availability and simplicity method of demonstration of logic following in economic rea-
soning. Linear diagrams are only graphic reductions of tables.  
Below the inference rules are given. These rules of transformation are formulated in graphic 
(partially pseudo-symbolical) language of existential tables in which the linear diagrams are in-
scribed by fat lines. The existential tables for transfer of the economic and not only  economic in-
formation in with the designation of existence (non-emptiness of sets) is «+»and the designation of 
non-existence (emptiness of sets)  is «-» are usual enough and easily understood. 
The inference rules of this tabular method are: 
I. Rules of carrying of information from a partial table-premise, or ELTD, in the summary 
table, or ELTD, with additional discussed properties and additional splitting of columns:  
1. If and only if there is A, then there is A B or A not-B. 
2. If and only if there isn’t A, then there isn’t neither A B, nor A not-B. 
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Fig. 3. 
1. x A(x)  x ((A(x)  B(x))  (A(x)  ¬B(x))) 
2. ¬x A(x)  (¬x (A(x)  B(x))  ¬x ((A(x)  ¬B(x))) 
II. Rules of association of information taken from partial tables-premises in the diagram of 
reason in the summary table:  
3. If and only if there is A, then there is A.  
4. If and only if there is A and there is A, then there is A. 
5. If and only if there is A or not-A and there is A, then A is present.  
6. If and only if there is A or not-A and A is not present, then there isn’t A, and not-A is present.  
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7. If and only if there are A, B, or C, and there A is not present, then A is not present, and there is B 
or C. 
8. If and only if there isn’t A, then there isn’t A. 
9. If and only if there isn’t A and there isn’t A, then there isn’t A. 
(6 – 7. If and only if according even to one table-premise there is no it, in a result: it is not present). 
10. If there is A and there isn’t A, this is the contradiction which it is necessary to eliminate. 
11. If there is A or B, and both A and B are not present, it’s contradiction. 
(10 – 11. If according to one premise it is present, and according to another it is not present, the data 
about its presence are contradictory). 
12. If and only if there is A or B and there is B or C, then there is A or B and there is B or C. 
3 4 5 
+ + · · 
+ + 
6 7 
· · · · · 
- - 
 + + + 
 
- + - · · 
 
 
 
8 9 10 
- - + 
11 12 
· · · · 
- - - - · · 
 
- - п 
 
п п · · 
· · 
 
 
 
3. x A(x)  x A(x) 
4. (x A(x)  x A(x))  x A(x) 
5. (x (A(x)  ¬A(x))  x A(x))  x A(x) 
Fig. 4. 
6. (x (A(x)  ¬A(x))  ¬x A(x))  (¬x A(x)  x ¬A(x)) 
7. (x (A(x)  B(x)  C(x))  ¬x A(x))  (¬x A(x)  x (B(x)  C(x))) 
8. ¬x A(x)  ¬x A(x) 
9. (¬x A(x)  ¬x A(x))  ¬x A(x) 
10. x A(x)  ¬x A(x)  contr., or (x A(x)  ¬x A(x)  contr. (x A(x)  ¬x A(x))) 
11. x (A(x)  B(x))  ¬x A(x)  ¬x B(x)  contr. 
12. x (A(x)  B(x))  x (B(x)  C(x))  x (A(x)  B(x))  x (B(x)  C(x)) 
On these diagrams "+" corresponds to any number, which greater of zero, and "­" corre- 
sponds to zero. The symbol of point can mean, for example, that it is known, how many B subjects 
are present, but it is not known, how many C and not C are among them. At numerical filling of the 
tables the numeric data can contradict itself only partially. For example, if according to one docu- 
ment there are 5Х, and according to another there are just 3Х about the same object, place, time and 
relation, the information only about 2Х is contradictory: 
 
A   and   A A 
5 3 consequently  3 
2 - contr. 
 
Fig. 5. 
 
III. If the information of basis is not interesting, it is necessary to take out important infor- 
mation by transformation of initial table to the table – conclusion. It is made by the following rules: 
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13. Only if there isn’t A B and A not-B is not present, A is not present. (If it isn’t present neither 
such nor not-such [other], so it is not present). 
14. If and only if there is A B or A not-B, then there is A. (If it is, such or not such, it is.) 
 
 13 (1)  
    
    
 - -  
    
     -  
 
 
 
 14 (2)  
    
    
 · ·  
    
     +  
 
    
Fig. 6. 
13. ¬x (A(x)  B(x))  ¬x (A(x)  ¬B(x))  ¬x A(x)  
14. x ((A(x)  B(x))  (A(x)  ¬B(x)))  x A(x)  
15. If there is A B, then there is A.  
16. If at transformation "+" and "." get in one column, the above mentioned rule 5 works: if there is 
A or not-A and there is A, then there is A. 
17. If there is (are) A B, then there is (are) A B or A not-B. 
18. If there isn’t A, then there isn’t A B. 
Below in diagrams 19 is shown action of rules 17 and 18 in the same times. 
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Fig. 7. 
 
15. x (A(x)  B(x))  x A(x)  
16. See 5.  
17. x (A(x)  B(x))  x ((A(x)  B(x))  (A(x)  ¬B(x)))  
18. ¬x A(x)  ¬x (A(x)  B(x)) 
Mainly, action of rules 6, 7, and also association of the information about not-existence give 
the new information. The full information which contains in the diagram of the reason on fig. 8, 
does not contain neither in any of premises, nor in their combination without application of infer-
ence rules. Deduction serves as a method of theoretical cognition.   
Rules 1-9, 12, 13, 14 provide a conclusion without information loss such conclusion which is 
equivalent to the reason. Rules 15, 17, 18 provide a conclusions with a part of the information of the 
reason. Rules 10, 11 fix the information about what simplest propositions are contradictory. It in 
scientific thinking can be rather significant, as, for example, knowledge of that which denying of a 
postulate of Euclid's geometry differ Lobachevski’s and Riman geometry. In this connection the 
rule 10 can be transformed to equivalence: x A(x)  ¬x A(x)  contradiction (x A(x)  ¬x 
A(x)).  
Addition to the rules of tabular method: conclusion about subjects is correct, if its premises 
are propositions describing the same discussed case. 
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Diagrammatic systems could provide us with rigorous proofs [5]. Optimal construction of 
the logic of statistical tables is carried out in the language of linear-tabular diagrams. We illustrate 
the resolution of the method ELTD for example A. 
Example A.  
Below are four propositions-premises (the letters A, B, C, D, E – product names, or others) 
and proposition-conclusion:  
Not each С1not-D is 3either A2or C. 
Each not-B
4
not-D is 
6
 neither A
5
nor C. 
There is only
7
not-D E. 
All E, except not-B
8
not-C, are
10
C
9
B. 
There are B C not-D E, which not each are A, and there is not-A not-B not-C not-D E, and there is 
nothing else.
11 
This is the inference-equivalence. We must prove that the reason (a combination of premises 
and applied rules of inference) is equivalent to a conclusion.  
Separate diagrams for each operation are given to facilitate understanding of the solution in 
Fig. 8. They are obtained by substituting the required terms in those diagrams dictionary connec-
tives and propositional forms, which determine the value of these operations.  
 
1.  — — — — 2.  — — — — 3.  — — — — 4.  — — — — 5.  — — — — 
 C — —    A — —    1 — —    B — —    A — —   
 D —  —   C —  —   2 —  —   D —  —   C —  —  
 1  —    2  — —   3 + +    4    —  5    — 
                              
6.  — — — — 7.  — — — — 8.  — — — — 9.  — — — — 10. E — — — — 
 4 — —    D — —    B — —    B — —    8 — —   
 5 —  —   E —  —   C —  —   C —  —   9 —  —  
 6 + -    7 - - + -  8    —  9 —     1 - + + - 
  
Fig. 8. Separate diagrams for operations. 
Information of these diagrams at the following inference rules is transferred to the appropriate 
lines of the diagram in Fig. 9. This is a combined diagram premises, as well as reason and conclu-
sions.  
 
 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
E — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —                 D — — — — — — — —         — — — — — — — —         
C — — — —     — — — —     — — — —     — — — —     
B — —   — —   — —   — —   — —   — —   — —   — —   
A —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  
1         — — — —          — — — —   
2  —  — —  —  —  — —  —  —  — —  —  —  — —  —  
3         · · · ·             · · · ·     
4           — —   — —         — —   — — 
5      —  —      —  —      —  —      —  — 
6           - -  - ·        
 
 - -  - · 
7 - - - - - - - - · · · · · · · · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
8       — —       — —       — —       — — 
9 — —     — —     — —     — —     
10 · · - - - - · · · · - - - - · ·                 
11 - - - - - - - - + + - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Fig. 9. The combined diagram premises, reason and conclusions.
The diagram in Fig. 9 is enough to record the construction and testing of such inferences. 
Even faster diagram is drawn, if the part with the letters A, B, C, D, E transferred to the blank which 
printed by printer or applied onto logical ruler  
Below the above inference is written in the language of predicate logic with this interpretation 
of propositional forms that is fixed in the diagram dictionary:  
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x ((С(x)  D(x))  (A(x)  C(x))) x ((С(x)  D(x))(A(x)  C(x)))  x ((B(x)  
D(x))  (A(x)  C(x))) x ((B(x)  D(x))  (A(x)  C(x)))  x (D(x)  E(x))  x 
(D(x)  E(x))  x (E(x)  (B(x)  C(x))  (C(x)  B(x))) x (E(x)  (B(x)  C(x))  
(C(x)  B(x))) x (E(x)  (B(x)  C(x))  (C(x)  B(x))) x (E(x)  (B(x)  C(x))  
(C(x)  B(x)))  x (E(x)  D(x)  C(x)  B(x)  A(x))  x (E(x)  D(x)  C(x)  B(x)  
A(x))  x (E(x)  D(x)  C(x)  B(x)  A(x))  x  ((E(x)  D(x)  C(x)  B(x))  
(E(x)  D(x)  C(x)  B(x)  A(x))) 
[ - “either… or…”(See Fig. 8, diagram 2); - “neither … nor…”(See Fig. 8, diagram 5)] 
As far as I know, there is no alternative theory of inference, which would suggest that the 
method allows for 10 minutes a man without a computer to prove or disprove this equivalence. A 
conclusion from several complex premises in natural language can be done by constructing a dia-
gram more successfully than any symbolic methods. The condition of this success is building a new 
logical system, the theory of inference evidence. The basis of this theory is a new pictorial lan-
guage. 
Two-letter diagrams of individual operations can be not drawing, but necessarily to keep in mind.  
If all the information of reason diagram is not reading in the form of relatively easy proposi-
tion as in this case, for each of the individual propositions of a complex conclusion we are building 
separate connective lines in an integrated diagram. We do not need to pencil such diagrams of the 
partial conclusions, and usually remember the areas from which the information is considered and 
extracted in conclusion, it is not difficult. As you develop solving skills to these problems an in-
creasing number of operation scan be performed in the mind, and write the solution can be shorten. 
First detailed external models of doing any graphics, gradually more and more executed in his 
mind, become internal mental models. The diagrams as external representation become freely used 
internal mental representation. 
 Individual control of reasoning is necessary condition of subject’s independence, freedom 
and personal responsibility for substantiation of accepted decisions. Also it is training of intuitive 
logicality. Economic activity is documented in tables. In them the economic thinking has reliable 
enough logic means, which deserve to be studied regularly, to be improved, to be used consciously 
and to be passed to the next experts. 
In some publications of last time an economic science is refused in status of exact science, in 
knowledge of the objective laws, and, therefore, in accomplishment of prognostic function, which is 
based on such knowledge. Other question is whom, where and when such withdrawal of economic 
science of its status is advantageous. Each subject of knowledge and any system of knowledge are 
doomed to imperfection and falseness of information about cognized object. In this sense there isn’t 
any distinction in kind between economic science and other sciences. There can be claims on the 
part of used empirical methods of reception of initial information and on the part of methods of the 
further theoretical information organization. One of the most important methods of theory is deduc-
tive logic with its semantic methods. 
At the faculty of economics in BSU the practical logic is successfully read as a course for 
choice. It was developed by author, and it is oriented to professional training of economists. The 
last ten years, the author of this article gave a course of logic of choice for economists do not feel 
necessity to pass to reading of ‘informal logic’ or etc. In fact, I teach a course of image-bearing 
practical logic of natural language. Logical culture of this language should be high enough for any 
scientist, economist, lawyer and simply a businessman. 
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